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Organised crime in Australia has received increased attention over the last decade, with  
the enactment of legislation and the development of other interventions that have sought  
to control this serious criminal phenomenon. Although the success of such interventions  
in reducing organised crime is yet to be subject to detailed evaluation, prior research has 
identified certain risks associated with policy responses that could, arguably, also lead to 
counterproductive consequences (Guerette & Bowers 2009; Smith, Wolanin & Worthington 
2003). One consequence of enhanced legislation and/or law enforcement approaches 
developed to combat organised crime is so-called ‘tactical crime displacement’, namely 
that criminals may modify their tactics in order to circumvent the effects of new legislation or 
increased law enforcement activity, thus allowing them to continue to offend with a reduced 
risk of detection or criminal justice action taking place. One particular risk of tactical crime 
displacement is the potential for organised crime groups to focus more on forming corrupt 
relationships with public officials in order to obtain information that minimises the risk of 
detection and prosecution.
This paper illustrates how organised criminal groups can alter their patterns of offending  
by inducing public officials into corruptly disclosing information relevant to the facilitation  
of further criminal activity. This process of corruption is explained using the notion of ‘crime 
scripts’, as developed by Cornish (1994), and applied in the context of organised crime. 
Following an analysis of the crime scripts used by organised criminals in relation to the 
corruption of public servants in selected cases in Australia, various situational crime 
prevention solutions based on Ekblom’s (2011) 5Is approach to crime prevention are 
explored as potential ways in which to minimise risks of this nature.
International context
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) is the 
primary international instrument dedicated to combating organised crime. For present 
purposes, organised crime will be defined in accordance with article 2 of UNTOC (UN 
2004a), which is also the definition adopted by Australian law enforcement and government 
agencies following the Convention’s ratification in 2004, namely:
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Government introduced the Anti-money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006 (Cth) which increased 
regulatory controls over businesses 
potentially able to facilitate organised 
criminal activities such as money 
laundering. The implementation of 
tougher legislation and associated law 
enforcement interventions may result  
in criminal organisations adjusting their 
tactics in order to continue their activities 
without detection. In this paper, the  
risk and potential impact of tactical 
displacement by organised criminals is 
discussed with regard to the potential for 
increased attempts by organised crime 
groups to corrupt public servants. There 
is a paucity of research exploring the 
nature and extent of public sector 
corruption committed by organised 
crime groups. This discussion is 
informed by literature on ‘crime scripts’ 
originally developed by Cornish (1994) 
and the 5I’s crime prevention framework 
developed by Ekblom (2011). Making  
use of public-source information about 
the commission of such crimes, as 
exemplified in two recent corruption 
cases, some intervention strategies  
are proposed that may be effective in 
reducing the risks of corruption of public 
sector officials by organised crime groups 
in Australia.
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•	 a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time, 
acting in concert with the aim of 
committing serious criminal offences in 
order to obtain financial or material benefit 
[where];
•	 a serious crime is defined as an offence 
punishable by at least four years’ 
imprisonment; and
•	 a structured group is one that is not 
randomly formed, but has some existing 
internal structure and exists for some 
period of time before and after the 
commission of an offence.
The United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) (UN 2004b) outlines 
the actions that amount to corruption from 
an international perspective. These include, 
but are not limited to, bribery of national 
public officials, abuse of functions and 
power, using office for personal gain and 
any actions that violate the interests of the 
public (UN 2004b).
Although organised crime and corruption 
are dealt with in separate UN Conventions, 
they are not completely independent 
criminal phenomena. Prior research has 
found a strong association between public 
sector corruption and organised crime 
groups (Buscaglia & van Dijk 2004). For 
example, groups involved in human 
trafficking and people smuggling frequently 
seek to corrupt border and customs officials 
to facilitate cross-border trafficking 
operations (Holmes 2007). In addition, both 
theoretical and applied research has found 
that corruption is a key tool in the arsenal of 
organised crime groups (Sukharenko 2004; 
Vander Beken 2004).
Organised crime and 
corruption in Australia
Organised crime
The threat posed by organised crime  
in Australia is considered so great that 
legislation has been passed that aims to 
proscribe organised criminal activities and  
to regulate industries that could facilitate 
criminal behaviour (see below). Outlaw 
motorcycle gangs (OMCGs), motorcycle 
clubs or groups whose members use their 
clubs as conduits for criminal enterprises 
(Lozusic 2002), are the most recognised 
form of organised criminal enterprise in 
Australia (Holmes 2007). Alongside the 
highly visible OMCGs, there are also 
ethnic-based crime groups, family-based 
crime groups and groups formed on the 
basis of place of origin such as prisons 
(CCC WA 2005). The primary organised 
criminal activity in which these groups are 
involved is illicit drug trafficking, however, 
criminal syndicates also engage in money 
laundering and financial crime to further 
expand and to legitimise their criminal 
organisations (ACC 2011).
Criminal organisations in Australia  
are networks of criminals varying in 
sophistication, which have highly flexible 
structures and modes of operation (ACC 
2011). These organisations have the ability 
to infiltrate a wide range of industries and 
markets, while adapting to changing 
opportunities, economies and technologies, 
all in order to increase their profits (ACC 
2011). For this reason, these networks 
contribute to a large proportion of serious 
crime in Australia (ACC 2011).
Organised crime in Australia can have a 
negative effect on the economy by affecting 
legitimate businesses’ access to resources, 
reducing tax revenue and increasing costs 
to the criminal justice system (ACC 2011). 
The estimated cost of organised crime in 
Australia is between $10b and $15b a year, 
due predominately to the loss of legitimate 
business and taxation revenue (ACC 2011). 
In addition to the economic cost of 
organised crime, there are also long-term 
harmful effects on the health and welfare 
systems (ACC 2011).
Corruption
The corruption of public officials in Australia 
is often highly publicised as it violates the 
notion of ‘public service’ through the 
officials’ abuse of power and position. 
However, little research has been carried  
out in Australia regarding the link—if any—
between organised crime and corrupt public 
officials. Yet corruption has been identified in 
both the wider public sector and the criminal 
justice system in particular (ACC 2011).
In recent history, there have been some 
highly publicised instances of official 
corruption with links to organised crime 
groups (see Boxes 1 & 2). However, 
compared with the international community, 
Australia has experienced a relatively small 
amount of organised crime in this sphere 
and there is little public-source evidence  
to suggest that there is any large-scale 
infiltration of the public sector by criminal 
organisations (Gilligan & Bowman 2007). 
Despite this, there is, arguably, an ongoing 
risk of corruption of public servants by 
criminal organisations. One reason for  
this lies in the impediments that have been 
created to the commission of organised 
crime through the use of more intensive 
legislation and the development of 
coordinated law enforcement activities.  
Box 1 Corrupt release of police intelligence reports
On 5 November 2009, law enforcement investigators made the first of several releases of controlled intelligence reports 
onto the NSW Police computer system in order to determine if a staff member was corruptly passing on intelligence to 
criminal contacts. The operation also included the covert surveillance of a Police General Support Intelligence Analyst. 
Covert surveillance and IT audit logs captured the Police Analyst accessing the controlled intelligence report via privileges 
on the police computer system. He was observed reading the report on his screen and then printing the report before 
reading it again. He then made a telephone call while viewing the report.
An hour and 45 minutes later, the Analyst made a mobile telephone call to his cousin, a person known to associate with  
an OMCG. During the course of this conversation, the Police Analyst made arrangements to meet his cousin that evening. 
Before leaving for the meeting surveillance observed him removing pages—containing the narrative—of the report and 
placing them in his briefcase.
On 10 November, police became aware that a person believed to be heavily involved in illegal drug distribution, was aware 
of information specific to an intelligence report released on 5 November. Examination of telephone records showed the 
drug dealer, his brother and the Police Analyst’s cousin had had contact.
Between 17 November and 15 December, officers of the Professional Standards Command released another two 
controlled intelligence reports, one regarding an illegal poker night involving members of the OMCG, to which the Police 
Analyst had also been invited. Once again, covert surveillance observed him accessing and printing the intelligence report 
before removing a section of the report and leaving the office. Later that day, he met his cousin and was observed having 
a lengthy discussion. The exchange of an item was also observed. 
On 16 December, search warrants were executed at the premises of the Police Analyst and his cousin. A number of 
exhibits were seized including an internal police computer system profile of a Person of Interest from the cousin’s 
premises. Subsequent analysis of IT audit logs found that the Analyst had accessed and printed the same report as  
that found in his cousin’s premises. Fingerprint analysis of the seized report found both the Analyst’s and his cousin’s 
fingerprints on the report. 
On 3 December 2010, the Police Analyst was found guilty on three counts of unlawfully disclosing and releasing private 
and confidential information held by the police and was subsequently sentenced to a term of 14 months imprisonment, 
with a non-parole period of seven months (NSW Police Force 2009).
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If these measures make crime too difficult  
to commit using conventional approaches,  
it is arguable that organised criminals  
may look to alternate means, such as the 
corruption of public servants as an effective 
way of gathering the information and 
resources needed to continue their patterns 
of offending unabated. Public servants are 
important gatekeepers of information critical 
to the commission of serious crime, such  
as personal identity information, as well  
as strategic police intelligence on how 
organised crime is being investigated and 
monitored. Obtaining this information from 
insiders is an efficient means of planning  
a major criminal enterprise.
Australian legislation  
and interventions
Anti-money laundering legislation in Australia 
was developed as a response to two Royal 
Commissions in the 1980s, which exposed 
links between money laundering and 
organised crime—particularly major tax 
evasion and fraud. The Financial 
Transactions Reports Act 1988 (Cth) (FTR 
Act) was the first piece of legislation in 
Australia that focused on preventing and 
detecting money laundering. The FTR Act 
required various financial entities to report 
suspicious transactions, transactions over  
a certain financial level and transactions 
going overseas. In 2006, the Anti-money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing 
Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act) replaced  
the FTR Act, extending regulatory controls 
to alternative remittance providers, due to 
the concern that these systems could be 
abused to facilitate money laundering, 
organised crime and the financing of 
terrorism.
In addition to these preventive measures, 
stolen asset recovery mechanisms also  
exist in Australia. The Commonwealth 
confiscation of assets regime is contained  
in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) 
(POCA 2002), which allows law enforcement 
to pursue the recovery of assets linked to  
an offence after a conviction. POCA 2002 
also allows civil recovery of assets, such 
that assets suspected of criminal origins are 
able to be seized without the necessity of a 
criminal conviction. POCA 2002 is designed 
to prevent the laundering of illegal profits 
made by organised crime groups, which  
will further prevent engagement in criminal 
activities by these groups. Each state and 
territory in Australia also has comparable 
versions of organised crime-related 
legislation.
Displacement risks
Crime control initiatives, such as those 
outlined above, can cause crime 
displacement by triggering changes in  
the location, time, target, offence tactic  
or offender (Guerette & Bowers 2009). 
Crime displacement can be:
•	 temporal—(ie offenders alter the time  
at which they commit the offence);
•	 spatial—(ie offenders change the location 
of their offending);
•	 target—(ie offenders shift from one target 
to another);
•	 tactical—(ie offenders use different 
methods to carry out their crimes);
•	 offence—(ie offenders switch from one 
crime type to another); and
•	 offender—(ie new offenders replace 
existing offenders) (Guerette & Bowers 
2009).
If legislation is effective in preventing 
organised criminal activities, crime 
displacement may occur. There have been 
few evaluations or other research conducted 
into displacement effects of organised crime 
prevention initiatives, with Levi and Maguire 
(2004) acknowledging that displacement as 
a result of organised crime prevention 
initiatives would be difficult to measure, 
despite evidence suggesting that 
displacement is occurring. This difficulty 
arises from the absence of a universal 
definition of organised crime and the nature 
of such criminal organisations, which are 
‘underground’ or covert by nature and 
therefore hidden (Levi & Maguire 2004). 
Further, while displacement research typically 
examines street crimes, such as burglary 
and motor vehicle crime, organised crime  
by its nature is complex, taking place across 
different locations and times, and involving 
multiple offenders. Thus, spatial, temporal, 
offence and offender displacement may not 
be a major consequence of attempts to 
prevent organised crime because these 
factors are changing continuously, subject 
to the illegal and legal markets and the 
profit-driven nature of criminal organisations.
Box 2 Corrupt facilitation of drug trafficking
Between 2006 and 2008, the former Assistant Director Investigations at the NSW Crime Commission became involved 
with a drug trafficking organisation and the importation of 300kg of pseudoephedrine. At the time of his arrest, he had 
been with the NSW Crime Commission for 12 years ([2011] NSW Supreme Court 1422, 8 December 2011).
The criminal enterprise was suspected to have begun when the Crime Commission investigator became friends with  
a known international drug trafficker with connections to money laundering operations. Following his arrest for related 
offences, the drug trafficker acted as an informant to the Crime Commission with the former Assistant Director 
Investigations being one of his handlers ([2011] NSW Supreme Court 1422, 8 December 2011).
The former Assistant Director Investigations began his criminal activities when he entered into an agreement with his 
informant and a legitimate businessman to import a large quantity of pseudoephedrine concealed in a container of rice, 
which was being sent to the food importing and distribution business run by the business associate. The informant’s 
connections with Dutch organised crime syndicates were used to access the illegal substances ([2011] NSW Supreme 
Court 1422, 8 December 2011).
The former Assistant Director Investigations’ motivations for becoming involved in the criminal organisation were clearly 
financial gain, to clear himself of his debts and to provide for his family. It is believed that these debts may have been a 
result of a mortgage and his wife’s psychological and health problems (alcoholism). There was also an indication of his 
excessive spending in which he bought his mistress expensive gifts and took lavish holidays. However, the money received 
from the criminal enterprise was far beyond the amount needed to satisfy these expenses ([2011] NSW Supreme Court 
1422, 8 December 2011).
Throughout the investigation into his conduct, he was recorded using his professional knowledge and experience to  
advise the businessman on the steps to take to lessen the risk of the criminal organisation being detected. Specifically,  
he advised on what law enforcement procedures would be used in relation to the shipment. Using his personal contacts 
made through his position, he made enquiries about the status of a shipment of rice and whether it had come to the 
attention of Customs, reporting his findings to the businessman. The investigation also uncovered several email 
communications between the informant and the accused illustrating his key role in the trafficking of the substances 
([2011] NSW Supreme Court 1422, 8 December 2011).
The former Assistant Director Investigations had corruptly advised his conspirators and had used the resources available  
to him to further facilitate the criminal enterprise. He was charged with three offences in 2008:
1) conspiring to import;
2) knowingly taking part in the supply of a large commercial quantity of prohibited drugs; and
3) conspiring to pervert the course of justice.
In December 2011, he was found guilty of all three charges and sentenced to 22 years imprisonment with a non-parole 
period of 16 years ([2011] NSW Supreme Court 1422, 8 December 2011).
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However, there is some evidence for tactical 
displacement as a consequence of e-crime 
prevention techniques (Smith, Wolanin & 
Worthington 2003). It has been suggested 
that hardening electronic targets would 
motivate offenders to seek alternative 
means of performing their criminal activities 
by gaining access to the information they 
seek through internal agency sources, using 
methods such as corruption and infiltration. 
This is of relevance to the current discussion 
as cybercrime and the use of technology  
is a developing and increasingly used 
technique within criminal organisations (ACC 
2011; and see further discussion below).
The emerging risk of  
ICT and corruption
The use of information and communications 
technologies (ICT) in connection with 
corruption has been identified as an ongoing 
threat to the public sector in two broad 
ways (Smith & Jorna 2011). First, ICT may 
be the target or object of the offending;  
and second, ICT may be used as a tool  
for offending (Choo, Smith and McCusker 
2007). Of particular interest is the ability of 
organised crime groups to use ICT to assist 
in the corruption of individuals in the public 
sector. Research into the area of ICT and 
organised crime shows that a significant 
number of external breaches of data can  
be attributed to organised crime syndicates 
(Verizon & United States Secret Service 
2011). According to the 2011 Verizon Data 
Breach Investigations Report, external 
agents accounted for 92 percent of data 
breaches and 58 percent of these were 
attributed to organised criminal groups.
Organised crime groups can use ICT as  
a tool to access personal information of 
employees in the public sector, enhancing 
their ability to coerce individuals into behaving 
corruptly (eg identifying financial hardships, 
important contacts that might be exploited, 
or other personal and family vulnerabilities). 
In addition to ICT being used as a tool to 
access personal information illegally, the 
widespread presence of social networking 
sites (SNS) has enabled people to publish  
a significant amount of personal information 
electronically. Sensitive information can be 
found on SNS, such as nicknames and 
other information that can assist criminals  
to undertake more refined research on 
targets. Once a person’s name, job title  
and profession are discovered, address  
and phone numbers can be found from 
online directories. This information, when 
combined with information collected illegally 
and a number of other open sources of 
information, allows comprehensive dossiers 
to be developed (Hart 2010).
Further, the information available to organised 
crime groups is not only limited to sources 
available online. ICT-facilitated methods can 
be used in conjunction with more traditional 
methods, such as sifting through rubbish, 
which has the potential to generate vast 
amounts of personal information and that 
may be enough to coerce or to induce  
an individual into offending. An Australian 
example of a public official being corrupted 
by organised criminals is provided in Box 2, 
with the role that ICT played in the acts of 
corruption explored in Table 1. In light of  
this discussion on tactical displacement  
and e-crime, it seems reasonable to 
contend that the adoption of ICT as  
a means of corrupting public officials  
may increase and be associated with  
the introduction and enhancements  
of legislation and regulatory controls 
implemented in Australia to prevent and 
deter traditional organised crime activities.
Situational crime prevention 
and crime scripts
Understanding how organised crime groups 
may attempt to coerce public servants into 
disclosing information is a key element in its 
prevention. The benefit of taking a situational 
approach is the ability to focus on the goals 
and modus operandi of organised crime 
groups, rather than attempting to 
understand individuals and their criminality 
(Cornish & Clarke 2002). Reducing 
opportunities for crime is a complementary 
strategy to targeting offenders and may  
be more efficient overall. Once goals and 
methods are known, the next step is to 
develop techniques to prevent, constrain  
or disrupt the criminal activity. These need 
to be specifically tailored to the criminal  
acts and therefore require a detailed 
understanding of the whole process through 
which the crime is commissioned and then 
takes place (Cornish 1994). Research of this 
kind has already been undertaken in relation 
to the resale of stolen vehicles (Tremblay, 
Talon & Hurley 2001) and cheque forgery 
(Lacoste & Tremblay 2003).
To obtain an understanding of the crime 
commission process, Cornish (1994) argued 
that crimes can be examined through the 
use of crime scripts. Scripts are a sequence 
of ‘script functions’ and accompanying 
‘script actions’ that organise our knowledge 
and understanding of routine behavioural 
processes (Cornish 1994: 161). For 
example, eating at a restaurant involves 
more than just eating; it requires deciding 
which restaurant to eat at, entering the 
restaurant, choosing a table, ordering, 
waiting, eating, paying the bill and leaving 
(Cornish & Clarke 2002). Similarly, the 
commission of a crime or the coercion  
or inducement of a third party to commit  
a crime can be broken down into a number 
of routine processes. These include—
preconditions, initiation, actualisation, doing 
and post-conditions, and these script 
functions have corresponding script  
actions (Cornish 1994). By developing  
an understanding of how organised crime 
groups may try to coerce or induce public 
servants, a script analysis can then be  
used to identify the script functions and 
corresponding actions. In Table 1, a script 
analysis is provided of the corruption of the 
Police Investigator’s activities described in 
Box 2. The information gathered through 
this process can then be put to use in 
preventing such activities.
Ekblom’s 5Is framework
Once crime scripts have been developed,  
it is possible to address crime risks through 
the development of situational crime 
prevention initiatives (although crime scripts 
analysis may also inform conventional 
offender-focused investigations as well  
as the disruption of offending). Such an 
approach should also form part of the 
general processes of risk identification  
and management outlined in organisational 
principles of risk management that 
government agencies and business  
now adopt (Standards Australia 2009).
The crime prevention process should not, 
however, be over-simplified or there may  
be a risk of overlooking key strategies  
or implementing ineffective and costly 
initiatives. A systematic and evidence-based 
approach is required. One such approach  
is the 5Is framework developed by Paul 
Ekblom (2011). This approach aims to 
provide crime prevention practitioners  
Australian Institute of Criminology  |  5
with an evidence-based framework and 
methodology for implementing initiatives 
across a range of situational and offender-
oriented crime prevention methods.
The 5Is approach is framed around a 
sequence of tasks and steps, namely 
Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, 
Involvement and Impact:
•	 Intelligence is the process of collecting 
and analysing information. It should 
identify and develop understanding of the 
modus operandi of offenders and other 
relevant aspects of the crime. It should 
also generate understanding to support 
the other four elements of the 5Is 
approach.
•	 Intervention is about blocking, disrupting 
or diminishing the causes of the criminal 
event. For example, this may include 
removing the ability of organised crime  
to identify valuable public servant targets.
•	 Implementation is the conversion of 
intervention principles and methods into 
practice. This may require the input of 
resources to develop new practices or  
the development of new policies and 
procedures.
•	 Involvement requires the mobilisation  
of, and where appropriate, establishing 
partnerships with other agencies, 
departments or individuals. This should  
be led by the intelligence gathered at the 
first stage.
•	 Impact is the evaluation of the ultimate 
outcome, the intermediate outcomes and 
the process (Ekblom 2011).
The specific methodologies used at each  
of the five stages are dependent upon the 
resources available, the organisation and the 
risk posed. The 5Is approach is a detailed 
systematic approach to crime prevention, 
which is explained more fully at 
http://5isframework.wordpress.com. Levi 
and Maguire (2004) have also applied the 
approach specifically to the commission of 
organised crime.
The Intelligence stage, carried out in part 
through the crime scripts analysis described 
above, provides a greater understanding  
of the sequences of choices, decisions and 
actions of organised criminals. Additional 
intelligence should also be gathered 
alongside the completion of a script 
analysis, including an attempt to identify  
the factors within the environment and the 
criminal organisation itself that promote or 
may prevent criminal activity (Ekblom 2011). 
This stage sets the foundations and informs 
the subsequent four stages and ultimately 
informs the effective implementation of a 
strategy to prevent organised crime. With  
a successful script analysis completed, key 
points for intervention can be identified. For 
present purposes, only the first three stages 
of the 5Is framework will be examined  
as these stages are the most relevant to 
preventing organised crime activities that 
entail corruption. Involvement is less relevant 
to this specific case because the opportunities 
that facilitate corruption within the police are 
largely (though not exclusively) within the 
Table 1 Crime scripts analysis in the corruption of the former Assistant Director Investigations 
at the NSW Crime Commission by a drug trafficker
Script function  
(Cornish 1994:161) Script action Case study offender’s actions
Preparation (establishing 
network of contacts and 
background information)
Acquire required IT equipment
Find possible human information sources 
who could be corrupted; develop means of 
influence over these potential sources
Access to computers and internet
Forming friendship with the police 
investigator
Financial records, medical records
The police investigator’s phone and 
laptop—emails, text messages
Online searches—directories, media 
sites, search engines
SNS of the police investigator, his wife, 
family members and friends
Physical access to the police investigator
Pre-conditions (necessary 
preparatory acts)
Obtain possible target names Public sector employees
Informant’s handlers
Instrumental conditions 
(agreeing on initial acts to 
commence activity)
Select target The police investigator—on the basis of 
the established relationship with the target 
and desirability of his senior position
The police investigator also had financial 
difficulties and family troubles creating 
motivations for corruption
Instrumental initiation 
(essential preliminary research 
needed to execute activity)
Research background of target for 
information for coercion or inducement
Online searches to access home 
address, family members names
Media reporting on the Police Investigator
SNS of police investigator, family 
members and friends
Informant can use his relationship and 
proximity to the police investigator to 
access personal information on phone, 
laptop and other ICT
Instrumental actualisation 
(first steps taken to commence 
criminal activity)
Contact target The police investigator was the handler 
of the informant after an arrest.
Police investigator had interaction  
with the corruptor on a personal level 
therefore had the ability to contact him 
easily
Doing (undertaking principal 
criminal acts)
Use obtained information for coercion or 
inducement of target
Propose to the police investigator to 
import pseudoephedrine to assist with 
his financial troubles
Provide the police investigator with 
information that could initiate corrupt 
behaviour
Post-condition (procedures 
following commission of crime)
Access information/induce behaviour/ 
utilise corrupt official
The police investigator used his 
connections and knowledge to assist in 
the importation of illegal substances by 
providing information on how to avoid 
detection and investigation
Exit (finalisation of criminal 
activity)
Finalisation of corrupt activity Ensuring that corrupt conduct was not 
discovered
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control of the police themselves; that is, 
there are relatively few other external parties 
to involve. The prevention of corruption in 
other organisations (eg local government) 
will require greater attention  
to Involvement activity.
An application of the first three stages in 
relation to organised crime and ICT as a tool 
for corruption is presented in Table 2. This 
analysis is, however, limited owing to the 
absence of currently available information  
on the motivations and tactics employed  
by organised crime groups in connection 
with the corruption of public officials. The 
interventions described in Table 2 are aimed 
primarily at decreasing the desirability of 
using ICT as a means of corruption. This 
would potentially be achieved through 
increasing the risks of detection associated 
with using ICT as a coercion method—one 
of the basic situational crime prevention 
elements identified by Clarke (1995). For 
example, implementing firewalls in computer 
and data systems and introducing 
surveillance systems in public officials’ 
offices and workspaces would be 
appropriate. Privacy implications of 
introducing ongoing surveillance of staff, 
however, need to be balanced with the level 
of risk of corruption, the impact of corruption 
on agency operations and the perceived 
crime prevention benefits that might occur 
against broader agency and human 
resources considerations. In the case 
described in Box 2 above, surveillance  
of communications was clearly considered 
to be appropriate in the circumstances.
SNS have also been highlighted as a 
potential information source for criminal 
organisations. The introduction of codes  
of conduct for using SNS and penalties  
for not adhering to these guidelines may be 
one strategy worthy of further consideration.
Conclusion
Currently, few studies have adequately 
investigated the relationship between 
organised crime groups and attempted 
corruption in the public sector. Using 
information from some of the few publicly  
available cases in Australia, it is contended 
that first, enhanced legislative and law 
enforcement responses to organised  
crime may lead to a tactical displacement 
effect, such that organised criminals  
may increasingly attempt to gain ‘insider 
knowledge’ through the corruption of public 
officials to reduce the risk of apprehension 
as they commit crimes.  ICT is identified as 
a likely mechanism that may be embraced 
by organised criminals as a means to gather 
information on suitable targets.
The use of crime scripts analysis for 
understanding and preventing public sector 
corruption by organised crime groups has 
much to offer as a means of reducing 
serious and organised crime. By exploring 
the extent and nature of crime displacement 
effects resulting from recent policy initiatives, 
and then analysing the crime scripts that 
arise in connection with the displaced 
criminal activity, it is possible to identify  
a number of opportunities for early 
intervention to ensure that risks of corruption 
are minimised. The effectiveness of using 
crime scripts analysis and Ekblom’s 5Is in 
combination has been demonstrated and 
should be developed and investigated 
further.
Although this approach has illuminated the 
specific process of corruption employed  
by criminal organisations, further evidence  
is required to delineate the relationship 
between organised crime groups and 
corruption in the public sector more fully. 
With a sound evidence base and a better 
understanding of the crime scripts 
employed (such as could be obtained 
through interviewing convicted offenders), 
situational crime prevention frameworks, 
such as Ekblom’s 5Is framework, could then 
be applied to assist in understanding the 
crime commission process and to reveal 
suitable points for effective intervention and 
the prevention of attempts to corrupt public 
officials.
Table 2 Application of the 5Is framework to the crime scripts analysis of the corruption of the 
former Assistant Director Investigations at the NSW Crime Commission
Script action/intelligence Intervention Implementation
Acquire required IT 
equipment
Controlling dissemination of ICT Registering names of buyers
Screening online transactions of high-risk 
individuals
Find possible information 
sources
Preventing outside access of personal 
details for public officials
Limit the ability of informants and 
officials to form close friendships
Limit the amount of employee 
information released to the public
Firewalls—computer and internet security on  
all personal devices
Passwords
Monitoring of handlers when contacting 
high-risk  informants
Reduce amount of specific information released 
to the media
Obtain possible target 
names
Limited release of names of 
Investigations personnel
Withholding personal information and names 
from Internet site
Select target Increase difficulty in accessing/making 
contact with public officials
Decrease the desirability of using 
public officials to facilitate criminal 
activities
Monitoring of handlers when contacting 
high-risk  informants
Monitoring excessive lifestyle expenditure of 
officers
Research background of 
target for information for 
coercion or inducement
Reduce possible information sources 
on public officials
Limit the ability of informants and 
officials forming close friendships
Limit use of SNS by public officials
Limit dissemination of personal information on 
Web2 platforms (eg photos and names on SNS)
Monitoring of handlers when contacting 
high-risk  informants
Contact target Preventing contact through 
surveillance
Improve security within internal 
structures of the public sector 
regarding ICT
Education of public officials to detect and 
recognise corrupt behaviour
Anonymous hotlines for employees
Workplace PC surveillance
Use obtained information 
for coercion or 
inducement of target
Increase awareness of disincentives 
for colluding and rule setting
Limit the ability of informants and 
officials having inappropriate contact
Enhanced codes of conduct
Workplace PC surveillance
Monitoring of handlers when contacting 
high-risk  informants
Access information/induce 
behaviour/utilise corrupt 
official
Rule setting
Disincentives for corrupt behaviour
Codes for conduct
Workplace personal computer surveillance
Penalties for corrupt behaviour eg financial, 
professional penalties
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